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Abstract
In a social learning setting, there is a set of actions, each of which has a fixed but unknown
expected payoff. Agents arrive one by one, each chooses an action with the goal of maximizing
the payoff. A disclosure policy coordinates the choices of the agents by sending messages about
the history of past actions. These messages can alter agents’ incentives towards exploration,
taking potentially sub-optimal actions for the sake of learning more about their rewards. The
goal of the disclosure policy is to incentivize exploration so as to maximize social welfare; more
specifically, so as to minimize the regret of the action sequence chosen by the agents. Prior
work achieves much progress with disclosure policies that merely recommend an action to each
user. (Absent agents’ incentives, such policy is a multi-armed bandit algorithm.) However, all
this work relies heavily on trust and rationality assumptions, standard in economic theory, yet
quite problematic in the context of the motivating applications.
In this paper, we design disclosure policies which incentivize good performance under
more plausible behavioral assumptions. Conceptually, we would like to retain the trustwor-
thiness of revealing the full history, while avoiding the herding behavior induced by such
disclosure policy (which may lead to regret linear in the time horizon). We focus on messages,
called unbiased subhistories, consisting of the actions and rewards from a subsequence of past
agents, where the subsequence is chosen ahead of time. We further require these messages
to be transitive: if a message includes action and reward from a particular agent, then it also
includes the message sent to that agent. We posit a flexible model of agent response, which we
argue is plausible for this class of disclosure policies. Our main result is a disclosure policy
using unbiased, transitive subhistories that obtains regret O˜(
√
T ), where T is the time horizon.
We also exhibit simpler policies with higher, but still sublinear, regret. These policies can be
interpreted as dividing a sublinear number of agents into constant-sized focus groups, whose
histories are then fed to future agents.
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1 Introduction
In the classic literature on multi-armed bandits, an agent repeatedly selects one of a set of actions,
each of which has a payoff drawn from an unknown fixed distribution. Over time, she can trade
off exploitation, in which she picks an action to maximize her expected reward, with exploration, in
which she takes potentially sub-optimal actions to learn more about their rewards. By coordinat-
ing her actions across time, she can guarantee an average reward which converges to that of the
optimal action in hindsight at a rate proportional to the inverse square-root of the time horizon.
In many decision problems of interest, the actions are not chosen by a single agent, as above,
but rather a sequence of agents. This is particularly common in social learning settings such as
online websites, where a population of users try to learn about the content of the site. In such
settings, each agent will choose an exploitive action as the benefits of explorative actions are only
accrued by future agents. For example, in online retail, products are purchased by a sequence of
customers, each of which buys what she estimates to be the best available product. This behavior
can cause herding, in which all agents eventually take a sub-optimal action of maximum expected
payoff given the available information.
This situation can be circumvented by a centralized algorithm that induces agents to take
explorative actions, an idea called incentivizing exploration. Such algorithms are often encountered
in the form of recommendations and are quite common in practice. Many online websites, like
Amazon, Reddit, Yelp, and Tripadvisor, amongmany others, use recommendation policies of some
sort to help users navigate their offerings. One way recommendation policies induce exploration
is to introduce payments, e.g., [19, 24, 17]. For example, the recommendation system of an online
retailer might offer coupons to agents for trying certain products. When payments are financially
or technologically infeasible, another alternative is to rely on information asymmetry, e.g., [29,
16, 33, 12]. Here the idea is that the centralized algorithm, often called a disclosure policy, can
choose to selectively release information about the past actions and rewards to the agents in the
form of a message. For example, the recommendation system of an online retailer might disclose
past reviews or product rankings to the agents. Importantly, agents can not directly observe the
past, but only learn about it through this message. The agent then chooses an action, using the
content of the message as input.
Our scope. Prior work on incentivizing exploration, with or withoutmonetary incentives, achieves
much progress (more on this in “related work”), but relies heavily on the standard assumptions
of Bayesian rationality and the “power to commit” (i.e., users trust that the principal actually
implements the policy that it claims to implement). However, these assumptions appear quite
problematic in the context of recommendation systems of actual online websites such as those
mentioned above. In particular, much of the prior work suggests disclosure policies that merely
recommend an action to each user, without any other supporting information, and sometimes
recommend exploratory actions. This works out extremely well in theory, but it is very unclear
whether users would know and understand some complicated policy deployed by the principal,
let alone trust the principal to implement this policy. Even if they do understand the policy and
trust that it was implemented as claimed, it’s unclear whether users would react to it rationally.
Several issues are in play: to wit, whether the principal intentionally uses a different disclosure
policy than the claimed one (e.g., because its incentives are not quite aligned with the users’),
whether the principal correctly implements the policy that it wants to implement,1 whether the
1Large-scale systems that implement bandit algorithms can be notoriously difficult to debug [1].
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users trust the principal to make correct inferences on their behalf, and whether they find it ac-
ceptable that they may be singled out for exploration. Regardless of how the users react to such
disclosure policies, they may prefer not to be subjected to them, and leave the system.
We strive to design disclosure policies which mitigate these issues and (still) incentivize a good
balance between exploration and exploitation. While some assumptions on human behavior are
unavoidable, we are looking for a class of disclosure policies for which they are (more) plausible.
Then we arrive at a concrete mathematical problem: design policies from this class so as to opti-
mize performance, i.e., the induced explore-exploit tradeoff. Our goal in terms of performance is
to approach the performance of the social planner.
Our model. For the sake of intuition, let us revisit the full-disclosure policy that reveals the full
history of observations from the previous users. We interpret it as the “gold standard”: we posit
that users would trust such policy, even if they cannot verify it. Unfortunately, the full-disclosure
policy is not good for our purposes, essentially because we expect users to exploit rather than
explore. However, what if a disclosure policy reveals the outcomes for every tenth user, rather
than the outcomes for all users? We posit that users would trust such policy, too. Given a large
volume of data, users would not be too unhappy with having access to only a fraction this data.
A crucial aspect of our intuition here is that the “subhistory” revealed to a given user comes
from a subset of previous users that is chosen in advance, without looking at what happens during
the execution. In particular, the subhistory is not “biased”, in the sense that the disclosure policy
cannot subsample the observations so as to make a particular action look good. (If a subhistory is
subsampled in favor of some action, revealing is essentially no better than just issuing a recom-
mendation without any supporting evidence.) With this intuition in mind, we define the class of
unbiased-subhistory policies: disclosure policies that reveal, to each arriving agent t, a subhistory
consisting of the outcomes for a subset St of previous agents, where St is chosen ahead of time.
(From here on, we will use “users” and “agents” interchangeably.)
Further, we impose a transitivity property: if t′ ∈ St , for some previous agent t′, then St′ ⊂ St.
In words, agent t has all information that agent t′ had at the time she chose her action. Agent t
does not need to second-guess which message has caused agent t′ to choose that action, since such
second-guessing cannot possibly yield any additional information. Essentially, agent t can treat
the subhistory as a set of data points collected by an algorithm, and not worry how these data
points has been affected by other agents’ choices.
Following much of the prior work on incentivizing exploration, we do not attempt to model
heterogenous agent preferences and non-stationarity. We assume that the expected reward of
taking a given action a, denoted µa, is the same for all agents, and does not change over time.
We consider a flexible model of agent response. For each action a, the crucial statistics are
the number of samples Na and the empirical mean reward µ¯a in the observed subhistory. An
agent forms an estimate µˆa of the mean reward µa, roughly following µ¯a but taking into account
the uncertainty due to a small number of samples, and chooses an action with a largest reward
estimate. We allow the reward estimates to be arbitrary otherwise. The way they depend on the
observed statistics may differ from one agent to another. This dependence, as well as the statistics
and the reward estimates, are not known to the principal. We make no assumptions whatsoever
unless an agent has sufficiently many samples from a given arm.
Our model of agent response is justified by the assumption of unbiased, transitive subhistory.
This assumption is no longer needed once the model is assumed. The model is justified regardless
of what the agents know about the subsets (St : t ∈ [T ]). In particular, we could posit that these
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subsets are common knowledge, or that the agents do not know them, not even their own subset.
Regret. We measure the performance of a disclosure policy in terms of regret, a standard notion
from the literature on multi-armed bandits. Regret is defined as the difference in the total ex-
pected reward between the best fixed action and actions induced by the policy. Regret is typically
studied as a function of the time horizon T , which in our model is the number of agents. For
multi-armed bandits, o(T ) regret bounds are deemed non-trivial, and O(
√
T ) regret bounds are
optimal in the worst case. Regret bounds that depend on a particular problem instance are also
considered. A crucial parameter then is the gap ∆, the difference between the best and second best
expected reward. One can achieve O( 1
∆
logT ) regret rate, without knowing the ∆.
Our results and techniques. Our main result is a transitive, unbiased-subhistory policy which at-
tains near-optimal O˜(
√
T ) regret rate for a constant number of actions. This policy also obtains the
optimal instance-dependent regret rate O˜( 1
∆
) for problem instances with gap ∆, without knowing
the ∆ in advance. In particular, we match the best possible regret rates for the multi-armed ban-
dit problem (same as the prior work on unrestricted disclosure policies [34]). Each agent t sees a
substantial fraction of history available at time t: namely, our policy reveals a subhistory of size at
leastΩ(t/ polylog(T )). Our regret bounds scale exponentially in the number of actions; this depen-
dence is grossly suboptimal for multi-armed bandits, but matches the state-of-art for unrestricted
disclosure policies [34], and is conjectured to be unavoidable for incentivized exploration.
The main challenge is that the agents still follow exploitation-only behavior, just like they do
for the full-disclosure policy, albeit based only on a portion of history. A disclosure policy controls
the flow of information (who sees what), but not the content of that information.
The first step is to obtain any substantial improvement over the full-disclosure policy. We ac-
complish this with a relatively simple policy which runs the full-disclosure policy “in parallel” on
several disjoint subsets of agents, collects all data from these runs and discloses it to all remaining
agents. In practice, these subsets may correspond to multiple “focus groups”. While any single
run of the full-disclosure policy may get stuck on a suboptimal arm, having these parallel runs
ensure that sufficiently many of them will “get lucky” and provide some exploration. This simple
policy achieves O˜(T 2/3) regret. Conceptually, it implements a basic bandit algorithm that explores
uniformly for a pre-set number of rounds, then picks one arm for exploitation and stays with it
for the remaining rounds. We think of this policy as having two “levels”: Level 1 contains the
parallel runs, and Level 2 is everything else.
The next step is to implement adaptive exploration, where the exploration schedule is adapted
to previous observations. This is needed to improve over the O˜(T 2/3) regret. As a proof of concept,
we focus on the case of two actions, and upgrade the simple two-level policy with a middle level.
The agents in this new level receive the data collected in some (but not all) runs from the first
level. What happens is that these agents explore only if the gap ∆ between the best and second-
best arm is sufficiently small, and exploit otherwise. When ∆ is small, the runs in the first level do
not have sufficient time to distinguish the two arms before herding on one of them. However, for
each of these arms, there is some chance that it has an empirical mean reward significantly above
its actual mean while the other arm has empirical mean reward significantly below its actual
mean in any given first-level run. The middle-level agents observing such runs will be induced
to further explore that arm, collecting enough samples for the third-level agents to distinguish
the two arms. The main result extends this construction to multiple levels, connected in fairly
intricate ways, obtaining optimal regreat of O˜(T 1/2).
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Discussion. We argue that our subhistory-based policies require substantially weaker trust and
rationality assumptions compared to the minimal-disclosure policies in prior work. There are
several distinct issues here:
• Whether agents sufficiently understand the announced policy. We only need an agent to under-
stand that he is given some unbiased history. It does not matter what is the subset of rounds
and how it is related to the other agents’ subsets. This is arguably quite comprehensible,
compared to a full-blown spec of a bandit algorithm.
• Whether agents trust the principal’s intent to implement the stated policy. A third party can, at
least in principle, collect subhistories from multiple agents and check them for consistency
(e.g., that arms’ average rewards are within the statistical deviations). This should create
incentives for the principal not to manipulate the policy. Note that similar checks appear
virtually impossible for minimal-disclosure policies.
• Whether agents trust the principal to implement the stated policy without bugs. Faithfully re-
vealing a subhistory is arguably easy, whereas (as noted above) debugging an actual bandit
algorithm in a large-scale production-level system tends to be quite complicated.
• Whether agents react to the policy in a way that we assume. In our framework, an agent should
react to the subhistory as if it was a set of data points collected by an algorithm, free from
other agents’ influence. The system can provide summary statistics, so that agents would
not need to actually look at the raw data.2 Whereas verifying that a minimal-disclosure
policy is indeed incentive-compatible typically requires a sophisticated Bayesian reasoning.
Even though we are not showing full histories, even a small fraction of history would realis-
tically contain a large number of datapoints. Besides, a user usually looks at a small sample of
reviews. In our case, one could say that these reviews are just pre-selected by the algorithm (in an
“unbiased” and “transitive” way, as explained above).
For the sake of the analysis, we assume that the mean rewards lie in the interval [1/3,2/3],
whereas the agents’ response model does not take this fact into account.3 Our justification is two-
fold. First, agents may operate under incomplete information: they simply do not know that mean
rewards are restricted. Second, typical users of a recommendation system are unlikely to be fully
rational (whether Bayesian or not). Following empirical averages appears much more natural. In
particular, a realistic user should not estimate mean rewards as 1/3 if it keeps getting 0 rewards.
On a final note, we emphasize that we provide the first result on incentivized exploration that
does not rely on the strong assumptions of trust and rationality.
Related work. The problem of incentivizing exploration via information asymmetry was intro-
duced in [29], under the Bayesian rationality and the (implicit) power-to-commit assumptions.
The original problem – essentially, a version of our model with unrestricted disclosure policies –
was largely resolved in [29] and the subsequent work [33, 35]. Several extensions were considered:
to contextual bandits [33], to repeated games [35], and to social networks [8].
2Trusting the summary statistics is a relatively minor issue, one where ”cheating” can, in principle, be easily verified.
3Of course, the [1/3,2/3] restriction can be replaced with [ǫ,1 − ǫ] for any given global constant ǫ > 0 (which would
then propagate into the regret bounds).
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Several other papers study related, but technically different models: same model with time-
discounted utilities [12]; a version with monetary incentives [19] and moreover with heteroge-
nous agents [17]; a version with a continuous information flow and a continuum of agents [16];
coordination of costly exploration decisions when they are separate from the “payoff-generating”
decisions [28, 31, 32]. Scenarios with long-lived, exploring agents and no principal to coordinate
them have been studied in [13, 26].
Full-disclosure policy, and closely related “greedy” (exploitation-only) algorithm in multi-
armed bandits, have been a subject of a recent line of work [39, 25, 9, 38]. A common theme
is that the greedy algorithm performs well in theory, under substantial assumptions on hetero-
geneity of the agents. Yet, it suffers Ω(T ) regret in the worst case.4
Exploration-exploitation tradeoff received much attention over the past decades, usually un-
der the rubric of “multi-armed bandits”; see books [15, 14, 21] for background. Exploration-
exploitation problems with incentives issues arise in several other scenarios: dynamic pricing
[27, 11, 7], dynamic auctions [2, 10, 23], pay-per-click ad auctions [6, 18, 5], and human compu-
tation [22, 20, 40].
2 Model and Preliminaries
We study the multi-armed bandit problem in a social learning context, in which a principal faces
a sequence of T myopic agents. There is a set A of K possible actions, a.k.a. arms. At each round
t ∈ [T ], a new agent t arrives, receives a message mt from the principal, chooses an arm at ∈ A,
and collects a reward rt ∈ {0,1} that is immediately observed by the principal. The reward from
pulling an arm a ∈ A is drawn independently from Bernoulli distribution Da with an unknown
mean µa. An agent does not observe anything from the previous rounds, other than the message
mt . The problem instance is defined by (known) parameters K,T and the (unknown) tuple of
mean rewards, (µa : a ∈ A). We are interested in regret, defined as
Reg(T ) = Tmaxa∈Aµa −
∑
t∈[T ]E[µat ]. (1)
(The expectation is over the chosen arms at , which depend on randomness in rewards, and possi-
bly in the algorithm.) The principal chooses messages mt according to an online algorithm called
disclosure policy, with a goal to minimize regret. We assume that mean rewards are bounded away
from 0 and 1, to ensure sufficient entropy in rewards. For concreteness, we posit µa ∈ [13 , 23 ].
Unbiased subhistories. The subhistory for a subset of rounds S ⊂ [T ] is defined as
HS = { (s,as , rs) : s ∈ S } . (2)
Accordingly,H[t−1] is called the full history at time t. The outcome for agent t is the tuple (t,at , rt).
We focus on disclosure policies of a particular form, where the message in each round t is
mt =HSt for some subset St ⊂ [t −1]. We assume that the subset St is chosen ahead of time, before
round 1 (and therefore does not depend on the observationsHt−1). Suchmessage is called unbiased
subhistory, and the resulting disclosure policy is called an unbiased-history policy.
Further, we focus on disclosure policies that are transitive, in the following sense:
t ∈ St′ ⇒ St ⊂ St′ for all rounds t, t′ ∈ [T ].
4This is a well-known folklore result; e.g., see [36] for a concrete example.
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In words, if agent t′ observes the outcome for some previous agent t, then she observes the en-
tire message revealed to that agent. In particular, agent t′ does not need to second-guess which
message has caused agent t to choose action at .
A transitive unbiased-history policy can be represented as an undirected graph, where nodes
correspond to rounds, and any two rounds t < t′ are connected if and only if t ∈ St′ and there is
no intermediate round t′′ with t ∈ St′′ and t′′ ∈ St′ . This graph is henceforth called the information
flow graph of the policy, or info-graph for short. We assume that this graph is common knowledge.
Agents’ behavior. Let us define agents’ behavior in response to an unbiased-history policy. We
posit that each agent t uses its observed subhistory mt to form a reward estimate µˆt,a ∈ [0,1] for
each arm a ∈ A, and chooses an arm with a maximal estimator. (Ties are broken according to an
arbitrary rule that is the same for all agents.) The basic model is that µˆt,a is the sample average for
arm a over the subhistorymt , as long as it includes at least one sample for a; else, µˆt,a ≥ 13 .
We allow amuchmore permissivemodel that allows agents to form arbitrary reward estimates
as long as they lie within some “confidence range” of the sample average. Formally, the model is
characterized by the following assumptions (which we make without further notice).
Assumption 2.1. Reward estimates are close to empirical averages. Let Nt,a and µ¯t,a denote the number
of pulls and the empirical mean reward of arm a in subhistory mt . Then for some absolute constant
Nest ∈N and Cest = 116 , and for all agents t ∈ [T ] and arms a ∈ A it holds that
ifNt,a ≥Nest then
∣∣∣µˆta − µ¯ta∣∣∣ < Cest√
Nt,a
.
Also, µˆta ≥ 13 if Nt,a = 0. (NB: we make no assumption if 1 ≤Nt,a < Nest.)
Assumption 2.2. In each round t, the estimates µˆt,a depend only on the multiset { (as, rs) : s ∈ St },
called anonymized subhistory. Each agent t forms its estimates according to an estimate function ft
from anonymized subhistories to [0,1]K , so that the estimate vector (µˆt,a : a ∈ A) equals ft(mt). This
function is drawn from some fixed distribution over estimate functions.
Connection to multi-armed bandits. The special case when each message mt is an arm, and
the t-th agent always chooses this arm, corresponds to a standard multi-armed bandit problem
with IID rewards. Thus, regret in our problem can be directly compared to regret in the bandit
problem with the same mean rewards (µa : a ∈ A). Following the literature on bandits, we define
the gap parameter ∆ as the difference between the largest and second largest mean rewards.5 The
gap parameter is not known to the principal (in our problem), or to the algorithm (in the bandit
problem). Optimal regret rates for bandits with IID rewards are as follows [3, 4, 30]:
Reg(T ) ≤O
(
min
(√
KT logT , 1
∆
logT
))
. (3)
This regret bound can only be achieved using adaptive exploration: i.e., when exploration sched-
ule is adapted to the observations. A simple example of non-adaptive exploration is the explore-
then-exploit algorithm which samples arms uniformly at random for the first N rounds, for some
pre-set numberN , then chooses one arm and sticks with it till the end. More generally, exploration-
separating algorithms have a property that in each round t, either the choice of an arm does not
5Formally, the second-largest mean reward is maxa∈A:µ(a)<µ∗ µ(a), where µ∗ =maxa∈Aµ(a).
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depend on the observations so far, or the reward collected in this round is not used in the subse-
quent rounds. Any such algorithm suffers fromΩ(T 2/3) regret in the worst case.6
Preliminaries. We assume that K is constant, and focus on the dependence on T . However, we
explicitly state the dependence on K , e.g., using the OK () notation.
Throughout the paper, we use the standard concentration and anti-concentration inequalities:
respectively, Chernoff Bounds and Berry-Esseen Theorem. The former states that X¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi ,
the average of n independent random variables X1 , . . . ,Xn, converges to its expectation quickly.
The latter states that the CDF of an appropriately scaled average X¯ converges to the CDF of the
standard normal distribution pointwise. In particular, the average strays far enough from its
expectation with some guaranteed probability. The theorem statements are as follows:
Theorem 2.3. Fix n. Let X1, ...,Xn be independent random variables, and let X¯ =
1
n
∑n
i=1Xi . Then:
(a) (Chernoff Bounds) Assume Xi ∈ [0,1] for all i. Then
Pr[|X¯ −E[X¯]| > ε] ≤ 2exp(−2nε2).
(b) (Berry-Esseen Theorem) Assume X1 , . . . ,Xn are identically distributed, with
σ2 :=E[(X1 −E[X1])2] = σ2 and ρ :=E[|X1 −E[X1]|3] <∞.
Let Fn be the cumulative distribution function of
(X¯−E[X¯])√n
σ and Φ be the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution.
|Fn(x)−Φ(x)| ≤
ρ
2σ3
√
n
∀x ∈R.
We use the notion of reward tape to simplify the application of (anti-)concentration inequali-
ties. This is a K × T random matrix with rows and columns corresponding to arms and rounds,
respectively. For each arm a and round t, the value in cell (a, t) is drawn independently from
Bernoulli distributionDa. W.l.o.g., rewards in our model are defined by the rewards tape: namely,
the reward for the j-th pull of arm a is taken from the (a, j)-th entry of the reward matrix.
We use OK (·) notation to hide the dependence on parameter K , and O˜(·) notation to hide poly-
logarithmic factors. We denote [T ] = {1,2 , . . . ,T }.
3 Warm-up: full-disclosure paths
We first consider a disclosure policy that reveals the full history in each round t, i.e., mt = Ht−1;
we call it the full-disclosure policy. The info-path for this policy is a simple path. We use this policy
as a “gadget” in our constructions. Hence, we formulate it slightly more generally:
Definition 3.1. A subset of rounds S ⊂ [T ] is called a full-disclosure path in the info-graph G if the
induced subgraph GS is a simple path, and it connects to the rest of the graph only through the
terminal node max(S), if at all.
6The first explicit reference we know of is [6, 18], but this fact has been known in the community for much longer.
9
We prove that for a constant number of arms, with constant probability, a full-disclosure path
of constant length suffices to sample each arm at least once. We will build on this fact throughout.
Lemma 3.2. There exist numbers LFDPK > 0 and p
FDP
K > 0 that depend only on K , the number of arms, with
the following property. Consider an arbitrary disclosure policy, and let S ⊂ [T ] be a full-disclosure path
in its info-graph, of length |S | ≥ LFDPK . Under Assumption 2.1, with probability at least pFDPK , subhistory
HS contains at least once sample of each arm a.
Proof. Fix any arm a. Let LFDPK = (K − 1) ·Nest + 1 and pFDPK = (1/3)L
FDP
K . We will condition on the
event that all the realized rewards in LFDPK rounds are 0, which occurs with probability at least p
FDP
K
under Assumption 2.1. In this case, we want to show that arm a is pulled at least once. We prove
this by contradiction. Suppose arm a is not pulled. By the pigeonhole principle, we know that
there is some other arm a′ that is pulled at least Nest +1 rounds. Let t be the round in which arm
a′ is pulled exactly Nest +1 times. By Assumption 2.1, we know
µˆta′ ≤ 0+Cest/
√
Nest ≤ Cest < 1/3.
On the other hand, we have µˆta ≥ 1/3 > µˆta′ . This contradicts with the fact that in round t, arm a′ is
pulled, instead of arm a.
We provide a simple disclosure policy based on full-disclosure paths. The policy follows the
“explore-then-exploit” paradigm. The “exploration phase” comprises the firstN = T1·LFDPK rounds,
and consists of T1 full-disclosure paths of length L
FDP
K each, where T1 is a parameter. In the “ex-
ploitation phase”, each agent t > N receives the full subhistory from exploration, i.e., mt = H[N ].
The info-graph for this disclosure policy is shown in Figure 1.
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
all remaining rounds
LFDPK L
FDP
K L
FDP
K L
FDP
K L
FDP
KLevel 1
Level 2
T
im
e
T1 full-disclosure paths of length L
FDP
K each
Figure 1: Info-graph for the 2-level policy.
The info-graph has two “levels”, corresponding to exploration and exploitation. Accordingly,
we call this policy the two-level policy. We show that it incentivizes the agents to perform non-
adaptive exploration, and achieves a regret rate of O˜K (T
2/3). The key idea is that since one full-
disclosure path collects one sample of a given arm with constant probability, using many full-
disclosure paths “in parallel” ensures that sufficiently many samples of this arm are collected.
Theorem 3.3. The two-level policy with parameter T1 = T
2/3 log(T )1/3 achieves regret
Reg(T ) ≤OK
(
T 2/3 (logT )1/3
)
.
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Remark 3.4. For a constant K , the number of arms, we match the optimal regret rate for non-
adaptive multi-armed bandit algorithms. If the gap parameter ∆ is known to the principal, then
(for an appropriate tuning of parameter T1) we can achieve regret Reg(T ) ≤OK (log(T ) ·∆−2).
The proof can be found in Section 3.1. One important quantity is the expected number of
samples of a given arm a collected by a full-disclosure path S of length LFDPK (i.e., present in the
subhistoryHS . Indeed, this number, denoted NFDPK,a , is the same for all such paths. Then,
Lemma 3.5. Suppose the info-graph contains T1 full-disclosure paths of L
FDP
K rounds each. Let Na be
the number of samples of arm a collected by all paths. Then with probability at least 1− δ, for all a ∈ A,∣∣∣Na −NFDPK,a T1∣∣∣ ≤ LFDPK ·√T1 log(2K/δ)/2.
3.1 Details: proof of Theorem 3.3
We will set T1 later in the proof, depending on whether the gap parameter ∆ is known. For now,
we just need to know we will make T1 ≥ 4(L
FDP
K )
2
(pFDPK )
2 log(T ). Since this policy is agnostic to the indices
of the arms, we assume w.l.o.g. that arm 1 has the highest mean.
The first T1 ·LFDPK rounds will get total regret at most T1 ·LFDPK . We focus on bounding the regret
from the second level of T − T1 · LFDPK rounds. We consider the following two events. We will first
bound the probability that both of them happen and then we will show that they together imply
upper bounds on |µˆta −µa|’s for any agent t in the second level. Recall µˆta is the estimated mean of
arm a by agent t and agent t picks the arm with the highest µˆta.
DefineW a1 to be the event that the number of arm a pulls in the first level is at least N
FDP
K,a T1 −
LFDPK
√
T1 log(T ). As long as we set T1 ≥ 4(L
FDP
K )
2
(pFDPK )
2 log(T ), this implies that the number of arm a pulls
is then at least NFDPK,a T1/2. Define W1 to be the intersection of all these events (i.e. W1 =
⋂
aW
a
1 ).
By Lemma 3.5, we have
Pr[W1] ≥ 1−
K
T 2
≥ 1− 1
T
.
Next, we show that the empirical mean of each arm a is close to the true mean. To facilitate our
reasoning, let us imagine there is a tape of length T for each arm a, with each cell containing an
independent draw of the realized reward from the distribution Da. Then for each arm a and any
τ ∈ [T ], we can think of the sequence of the first τ realized rewards of a coming from the prefix of
τ cells in its reward tape. DefineW a,τ2 to be the event that the empirical mean of the first τ realized
rewards in the tape of arm a is at most
√
2log(T )
τ away from µa. DefineW2 to be the intersection of
these events (i.e.
⋂
a,τ∈[T ]W
a,τ
2 ). By Chernoff bound,
Pr[W a,τ2 ] ≥ 1− 2exp(−4log(T )) ≥ 1− 2/T 4.
By union bound,
Pr[W2] ≥ 1−KT ·
2
T 4
≥ 1− 2
T
.
By union bound, we know Pr[W1 ∩W2] ≥ 1 − 3/T . For the remainder of the analysis, we will
condition on the eventW1 ∩W2.
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For any arm a and agent t in the second level, byW1 andW2, we have
|µ¯ta −µa| ≤
√
2log(T )
NFDPK,a T1/2
.
ByW1 and Assumption 2.1, we have
|µ¯ta − µˆta| ≤
Cest√
NFDPK,a T1/2
.
Therefore,
|µˆta −µa| ≤
√
2log(T )
NFDPK,a T1/2
+
Cest√
NFDPK,a T1/2
≤ 3
√
log(T )
pFDPK T1
.
So the second-level agents will pick an arm a which has µa at most 6
√
log(T )
pFDPK T1
away from µ1. To sum
up, the total regret is at most
T1 · LFDPK +T · (1−Pr[W1 ∩W2]) +T · 6
√
log(T )
pFDPK T1
.
By setting T1 = T
2/3 log(T )1/3, we get regret O(T 2/3 log(T )1/3).
4 Adaptive exploration with a three-level disclosure policy
The two-level policy from the previous section implements the explore-then-exploit paradigm us-
ing a basic design with parallel full-disclosure paths. The next challenge is to implement adaptive
exploration, and go below the T 2/3 barrier. We accomplish this using a construction that adds a
middle level to the info-graph. This construction also provides intuition for the main result, the
multi-level construction presented in the next section. For simplicity, we assume K = 2 arms.
For the sake of intuition, consider the framework of bandit algorithms with limited adaptivity
[37]. Suppose a bandit algorithm outputs a distribution pt over arms in each round t, and the
arm at is then drawn independently from pt . This distribution can change only in a small number
of rounds, called adaptivity rounds, that need to be chosen by the algorithm in advance. A single
round of adaptivity corresponds to explore-then-exploit paradigm. Our goal here is to implement
one extra adaptivity round, and this is what the middle level accomplishes.
Construction 4.1. The three-level policy is defined as follows. The info-graph consists of three levels:
the first two correspond to exploration, and the third implements exploitation. Like in the two-level
policy, the first level consists of multiple full-disclosure paths of length LFDPK each, and each agent t in the
exploitation level sees full history from exploration (see Figure 2).
The middle level consists of σ disjoint subsets of T2 agents each, called second-level groups. Each
second-level group G has the following property:
all nodes in G are connected to the same nodes outside of G, but not to one another. (4)
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T2 rounds
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· · · · · ·
Level 1
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T
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e
σ groups
Figure 2: Info-graph for the three-level policy. Each red box in level 1 corresponds to T1
full-disclosure paths of length LFDPK each.
The full-disclosure paths in the first level are also split into σ disjoint subsets, called first-level
groups. Each first-level group consists of T1 full-disclosure paths, for the total of T1 · σ · LFDPK rounds in
the first layer. There is a 1-1 correspondence between first-level groups G and second-level groups G′,
whereby each agent in G′ observes the full history from the corresponding group G. More formally, agent
in G′ is connected to the last node of each full-disclosure path in G. In other words, this agent receives
message HS , where S is the set of all rounds in G.
The key idea is as follows. Consider the gap parameter ∆ = |µ1 −µ2|. If it is is large, then each
first-level group produces enough data to determine the best arm with high confidence, and so
each agent in the upper levels chooses the best arm. If ∆ is small, then due to anti-concentration
each arm gets “lucky” within at least once first-level group, in the sense that it appears much
better than the other arm based on the data collected in this group (and therefore this arm gets
explored by the corresponding second-level group). To summarize, the middle level exploits if
the gap parameter is large, and provides some more exploration if it is small.
Theorem 4.2. For two arms, the three-level policy achieves regret
Reg(T ) ≤O
(
T 4/7 logT
)
.
This is achieved with parameters T1 = T
4/7 log−1/7(T ), σ = 210 log(T ), and T2 = T 6/7 log−5/7(T ).
Let us sketch the proof of this theorem; the full proof can be found in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
The “good events”. We establish four “good events” each of which occurs with high probability.
(event1) Exploration in Level 1: Every first-level group collects at leastΩ(T1) samples of each arm.
(event2) Concentration in Level 1: Within each first-level group, empirical mean rewards of each
arm a concentrate around µa.
(event3) Anti-concentration in Level 1: For each arm, some first-level subgroup collects data which
makes this arm look much better than its actual mean and other arms look worse than their
actual means.
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(event4) Concentration in prefix: The empirical mean reward of each arm a concentrates around
µa in any prefix of its pulls. (This ensures accurate reward estimates in exploitation.)
The analysis of these events applies Chernoff Bounds to a suitable version of “reward tape”
(see the definition of “reward tape” in Section 2). For example, event2 considers a reward tape
restricted to a given first-level group.
Case analysis. We now proceed to bound the regret conditioned on the four “good events”.
W.l.o.g., assume µ1 ≥ µ2. We break down the regret analysis into four cases, based on the magni-
tude the gap parameter ∆ = µ1 − µ2. As a shorthand, denote conf (n) =
√
log(T )/n. In words, this
is a confidence term, up to constant factors, for n independent random samples.
The simplest case is very small gap, which trivially yields an upper bound on regret.
Claim 4.3 (Negligible gap). If ∆ ≤ 3√2 · conf (T2) then Reg(T ) ≤O(T 4/7 log6/7(T )).
Another simple case is when ∆ is sufficiently large, so that the data collected in any first-level
group suffices to determine the best arm. The proof follows from event1 and event2.
Lemma 4.4 (Large gap). If ∆ ≥ 4∑a∈A conf (NFDPK,a ·T1) then all agents in the second and the third
levels pull arm 1.
In the medium gap case, the data collected in a given first-level group is no longer guaranteed
to determine the best arm. However, agents in the third level see the history of not only one but all
first-level groups and the data collected by all first-level groups enables agents in the third level
to correctly identify the best arm.
Lemma 4.5 (Medium gap). All agents pull arm 1 in the third level, when ∆ satisfies
∆ ∈
[
4
∑
a∈A conf
(
σ ·NFDPK,a ·T1
)
, 4
∑
a∈A conf
(
NFDPK,a ·T1
)]
Finally, the small gap case, when ∆ is between Ω˜(
√
1/T2) and O˜(
√
1/(σ T1)) is more challenging
since even aggregating the data from all σ first-level groups is not sufficient for identifying the
best arm. We need to ensure that both arms continue to be explored in the second level. To
achieve this, we leverage event3, which implies that each arm a has a first-level group sa where
it gets “lucky”, in the sense that its empirical mean reward is slightly higher than µa, while the
empirical mean reward of the other arm is slightly lower than its true mean. Since the deviations
are in the order of Ω(
√
1/T1), and Assumption 2.1 guarantees the agents’ reward estimates are
also within Ω(
√
1/T1) of the empirical means, the sub-history from this group sa ensures that all
agents in the respective second-level group prefer arm a. Therefore, both arms are pulled at least
T2 times in the second level, which in turn gives the following guarantee:
Lemma 4.6 (Small gap). All agents pull arm 1 in the third level, when ∆ satisfies
∆ ∈
(
3
√
2 · conf (T2) , 4
∑
a∈A conf
(
σ ·NFDPK,a ·T1
))
Wrapping up: proof of Theorem 4.2. In negligible gap case, the stated regret bound holds
regardless of what the algorithm does. In the large gap case, the regret only comes from the first
level, so it is upper-bounded by the total number of agents in this level, which is σ · LFDPK · T1 =
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O(T 4/7 logT ). In both intermediate cases, it suffices to bound the regret from the first and second
levels, so
Reg(T ) ≤ (σ T1 · LFDPK +σ T2) · 4
∑
a∈A conf
(
NFDPK,a ·T1
)
=O(T 4/7 log6/7(T )).
Therefore, we obtain the stated regret bound in all cases.
4.1 Details: high-probability events
The following lemmas can be derived from combining Lemma 3.5 and union bound.
Lemma 4.7 (Concentration of first-level number of pulls.). Let W1 be the event that for all groups
s ∈ [σ] and arms a ∈ {1,2}, the number of arm a pulls in the s-th first-level group is in the range of[
NFDPK,a T1 − LFDPK
√
T1 log(T ),N
FDP
K,a T1 +L
FDP
K
√
T1 log(T )
]
,
where NFDPK,a is the expected number of arm a pulls in a f ull − disclosurepath run of length LFDPK . Then
Pr[W1] ≥ 1− 4σT 2 .
Proof of Lemma 4.7. For the s-th first-level group, define W a,s1 to be the event that the number
of arm a pulls in the s-th first-level group is between NFDPK,a T1 − LFDPK
√
T1 log(T ) and N
FDP
K,a T1 +
LFDPK
√
T1 log(T ). By Lemma 3.5
Pr[W a,s1 ] ≥ 1− 2exp(−2log(T )) ≥ 1− 2/T 2.
LetW1 be the intersection of all these events (i.e. W1 =
⋂
a,sW
a,s
1 ). By union bound, we have
Pr[W1] ≥ 1−
4σ
T 2
.
To state the events, it will be useful to think of a hypothetical reward tape T 1s,a of length T for
each group s and arm a, with each cell independently sampled fromDa. The tape encodes rewards
as follows: the j-th time arm a is chosen by the group s in the first level, its reward is taken from
the j-th cell in this arm’s tape. The following result characterizes the concentration of the mean
rewards among all consecutive pulls among all such tapes, which follows from Chernoff bound
and union bound.
Lemma 4.8 (Concentration of empirical means in the first level). For any τ1,τ2 ∈ [T ] such that
τ1 < τ2, s ∈ [σ], and a ∈ {1,2}, let W s,a,τ1,τ22 be the event that the mean among the cells indexed by
τ1, (τ1 + 1), . . . ,τ2 in the tape T 1a,s is at most
√
2log(T )
τ2−τ1+1 away from µa. Let W2 be the intersection of all
these events (i.e. W2 =
⋂
a,s,τ1,τ2
W
s,a,τ1 ,τ2
2 ). Then
Pr[W2] ≥ 1−
4σ
T 2
.
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Proof of Lemma 4.8. By Chernoff bound,
Pr[W
s,a,τ1,τ2
2 ] ≥ 1− 2exp(−4log(T )) ≥ 1− 2/T 4.
By union bound, we have
Pr[W2] ≥ 1−
4σ
T 2
.
Our policy also relies on the anti-concentration of the empirical means in the first round. We
show that for each arm a ∈ {1,2}, there exists a group sa such that the empirical mean of a is slightly
above µa, while the other arm (3−a) has empirical mean slightly below µ(3−a). This event is crucial
for inducing agents in the second level to explore both arms when the their mean rewards are
indistinguishable after the first level.
Lemma 4.9 (Co-occurence of high and low deviations in this first level). For any group s ∈ [σ],
any arm a, let µ˜a,s be the empirical mean of the first N
FDP
K,a T1 cells in tape T 1a,s. Let W
s,a,high
3 be the event
µ˜a,s ≥ µa+1/
√
NFDPK,a T1 and letW
s,a,low
3 be the event that µ˜a,s ≤ µa−1/
√
NFDPK,a T1. LetW3 be the event that
for every a ∈ {1,2}, there exists a group sa ∈ [σ] in the first level such that bothW sa ,a,high3 andW
sa ,3−a,low
3
occur. Then
Pr[W3] ≥ 1− 2/T .
Proof of Lemma 4.9. By Berry-Esseen Theorem and µa ∈ [1/3,2/3], we have for any a,
Pr[W
s,a,high
3 ] ≥ (1−Φ(1/2))−
5√
NFDPK,a T1
> 1/4.
The last inequality follows when T is larger than some constant. Similarly we also have
Pr[W s,a,low3 ] > 1/4.
SinceW
s,a,high
3 is independent withW
s,3−a,low
3 , we have
Pr[W
s,a,high
3 ∩W s,3−a,low3 ] = Pr[W
s,a,high
3 ] ·Pr[W s,3−a,low3 ] > (1/4)2 = 1/16.
Notice that (W
s,a,high
3 ∩W s,3−a,low3 ) are independent across different s’s. By union bound, we have
Pr[W3] ≥ 1− 2(1− 1/16)σ ≥ 1− 2/T .
Lastly, we will condition on the event that the empirical means of both arms are concentrated
around their true means in any prefix of their pulls. This guarantees that the policy obtains an
accurate estimate of rewards for both arms after aggregating all the data in the first two levels.
Lemma 4.10 (Concentration of empirical means in the first two levels). With probability at least
1− 4
T 3
, the following event W4 holds: for all a ∈ {1,2} and τ ∈ [NT ,a], the empirical means of the first τ
arm a pulls is at most
√
2log(T )
τ away from µa, where NT ,a is the total number of arm a pulls by the end
of T rounds.
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Proof of Lemma 4.10. For any arm a, let’s imagine a hypothetical tape of length T , with each cell
independently sampled from Da. The tape encodes rewards of the first two levels as follows: the
j-th time arm a is chosen in the first two levels, its reward is taken from the j-th cell in the tape.
Define W a,τ4 to be the event that the mean of the first t pulls in the tape is at most
√
2log(T )
τ away
from µa. By Chernoff bound,
Pr[W a,τ4 ] ≥ 1− 2exp(−4log(T )) ≥ 1− 2/T 4.
By union bound, the intersection of all these events has probability at least:
Pr[W4] ≥ 1−
4
T 3
.
LetW =
⋂4
i=1Wi be the intersection of all 4 events. By union bound,W occurs with probability
1−O(1/T ). Note that the regret conditioned onW not occurring is at most O(1/T ) ·T =O(1), so it
suffices to bound the regret conditioned onW .
4.2 Details: Case Analysis
Now we assume the intersection W of events W1, · · · ,W4 happens. We will first provide some
helper lemmas for our case analysis.
Lemma 4.11. For the s-th first-level group and arm a, define µ¯1,sa to be the empirical mean of arm a
pulls in this group. If W holds, then
|µ¯1,sa −µa| ≤
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,a T1
.
Proof. The events W1 and W
a,s,1,τ
2 for τ = N
FDP
K,a T1 − LFDPK
√
T1 log(T ), ...,N
FDP
K,a T1 + L
FDP
K
√
T1 log(T ) to-
gether imply that
|µ¯1,sa −µa| ≤
√
2log(T )
NFDPK,a T1 − LFDPK
√
T1 log(T )
≤
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,a T1
.
The last inequality holds when T is larger than some constant.
Lemma 4.12. For each arm a, define µ¯a to be the empirical mean of arm a pulls in the first two levels.
If W holds, then
|µ¯a −µa| ≤
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,a T1
.
Furthermore, if there are at least T2 pulls of arm a in the first two levels,
|µ¯a −µa| ≤
√
2log(T )
T2
.
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Proof. The eventsW1 andW
a,τ
4 for τ ≥ (NFDPK,a T1 − LFDPK
√
T1 log(T ))σ together imply that
|µ¯a −µa| ≤
√
2log(T )
σ
(
NFDPK,a T1 − LFDPK
√
T1 log(T )
) ≤
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,a T1
.
The last inequality holds when T is larger than some constant.
Lemma 4.13. For the s-th first-level group and arm a, define µ¯1,sa to be the empirical mean of arm a
pulls in this group. For each a ∈ {1,2}, there exists a group sa such that
µ¯
1,sa
a > µa +
1
4
√
NFDPK,a T1
and, µ¯
1,sa
3−a < µ3−a −
1
4
√
NFDPK,3−aT1
.
Proof. For each a ∈ {1,2}, W3 implies that there exists sa such that both W sa ,a,high3 and W sa ,3−a,low3
happen. The events W
sa ,a,high
3 , W1, W
sa ,a,τ,N
FDP
K,a T1
2 for τ = N
FDP
K,a T1 − LFDPK
√
T1 log(T ) + 1, ...,N
FDP
K,a T1 − 1
andW
sa ,a,N
FDP
K,a T1,τ
2 for τ =N
FDP
K,a T1, ...,N
FDP
K,a T1 +L
FDP
K
√
T1 log(T ) together imply that
µ¯
1,sa
a ≥ µa +
NFDPK,a T1 · 1√NFDPK,a T1 − L
FDP
K
√
T1 log(T ) ·
√
2log(T )
LFDPK
√
T1 log(T )
 · 1NFDPK,a T1 +LFDPK √T1 log(T )
> µa +
1
4
√
NFDPK,a T1
.
The second to the last inequality holds when T is larger than some constant. Similarly, we also
have
µ¯
1,sa
3−a < µ3−a −
1
4
√
NFDPK,3−aT1
.
This completes the proof.
Now we proceed to the case analysis.
Proof of Lemma 4.4 (Large gap case). Observe that for any group s in the first level, the empirical
means satisfy
µ¯1,s1 − µ¯1,s2 ≥ µ1 −µ2 −
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,1 T1
−
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,2 T1
≥
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,1 T1
+
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,2 T1
.
For any agent t in the s-th second-level group, by Assumption 2.1, we have
µˆt1 − µˆt2 > µ¯1,s1 − µ¯1,s2 −
Cest√
NFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
NFDPK,2 T1/2
≥
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,1 T1
+
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,2 T1
− Cest√
NFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
NFDPK,2 T1/2
> 0
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Therefore, we know agents in the s-th second-level group will all pull arm 1.
Now consider the agents in the third level group. Recall µ¯a is the empirical mean of arm a in
the history they see. We have
µ¯1 − µ¯2 ≥ µ1 −µ2 −
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,1 T1
−
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,2 T1
≥
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,1 T1
+
√
4log(T )
NFDPK,2 T1
.
Similarly as above, by Assumption 2.1, we know µˆt1 − µˆt2 > 0 for any agent t in the third level.
Therefore, the agents in the third-level group will all pull arm 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.5 (Medium gap case). Recall µ¯a is the empirical mean of arm a in the first two
levels. We have
µ¯1 − µ¯2 ≥ µ1 −µ2 −
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,1 T1
−
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,2 T1
≥
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,1 T1
+
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,2 T1
.
For any agent t in the third level, by Assumption 2.1, we have
µˆt1 − µˆt2 > µ¯1 − µ¯2 −
Cest√
σNFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
σNFDPK,2 T1/2
≥
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,1 T1
+
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,2 T1
− Cest√
σNFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
σNFDPK,2 T1/2
> 0.
So we know agents in the third-level group will all pull arm 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.6 (Small gap case). In this case, we need both arms to be pulled at least T2 rounds
in the second level. For every arm a, consider the sa-th second-level group, with sa given by
Lemma 4.13. We have
µ¯
1,sa
a − µ¯1,sa3−a > µa +
1
4
√
NFDPK,a T1
−µ3−a +
1
4
√
NFDPK,3−aT1
>
1
4
√
NFDPK,1 T1
+
1
4
√
NFDPK,2 T1
− 2

√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,1 T1
+
√
4log(T )
σNFDPK,2 T1

≥ 1
8
√
NFDPK,1 T1
+
1
8
√
NFDPK,2 T1
.
For any agent t in the sa-th second-level group, by Assumption 2.1, we have
µˆta − µˆt3−a > µ¯1,saa − µ¯1,sa3−a −
Cest√
NFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
NFDPK,2 T1/2
≥ 1
8
√
NFDPK,1 T1
+
1
8
√
NFDPK,2 T1
− Cest√
NFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
NFDPK,2 T1/2
> 0.
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So we know agents in the sa-th second-level group will all pull arm a. Therefore in the first two
levels, both arms are pulled at least T2 times. Now consider the third-level. We have
µ¯1 − µ¯2 ≥ µ1 −µ2 − 2
√
2log(T )
T2
≥
√
2log(T )
T2
.
Similarly as above, by Assumption 2.1, we know µˆt1 − µˆt2 > 0 for any agent t in the third level. So
we know agents in the third-level group will all pull arm 1.
5 O˜(
√
T ) regret with L-level policy
In this section, we give an overview of how we extend our three-level policy to a more adaptive
L-level policy for L > 3 in order to achieve a regret rate of OK (
√
T polylog(T )). We provide two
such policies. The first policy achieves the root-T regret rate with O(loglogT ) levels.
Theorem 5.1. For any L > 3, there exists an L-level disclosure policy with regret
OK
(
T 2
L−1/(2L−1) ·polylog(T )
)
.
In particular, there exists aO(loglog(T ))-level recommendation policy with regretOK (T
1/2polylog(T )).
Our second policy achieves an instance-dependent regret guarantee. This policy has the same
info-graph structure as the first one in Theorem 5.1, but requires a higher number of levels L =
O(log(T / loglog(T ))) and different group sizes. We will bound its regret as a function of the gap
parameter ∆ even though the construction of the policy does not depend on ∆. In particular, this
regret bound outperforms the one in Theorem 5.1 when ∆ is much bigger than T −1/2. It also has
the desirable property that the policy does not withhold too much information from agents—any
agent t observes a good fraction of history in previous rounds.
Theorem 5.2. There exists anO(log(T )/ loglog(T ))-level policy such that for every multi-armed bandit
instance with gap parameter ∆, the policy has regret
OK (min(1/∆,T
1/2) ·polylog(T ))
Moreover, under this policy, each agent t observes a subhistory of size at least Ω(t/ polylog(T )).
Note for constant number of arms, this result matches the optimal regret rate (given in Equa-
tion (3)) for stochastic bandits, up to logarithmic factors.
Let us present the main techniques in our solution; the full proofs are deferred to Section 5.1.
Similarly as Section 4, we first prove them in the case of 2 arms (Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.6).
We then extend them to the case of constant number of arms (Theorem 5.7).
A natural idea to extend the three-level policy is to insert more levels as multiple “check
points”, so the policy can incentivize the agents to perform more adaptive exploration. How-
ever, we need to introduce two main modifications in the info-graph to accommodate some new
challenges. We will first informally describe our techniques for the two-arm case.
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Interlacing connections between levels. A tempted approach to generalize the three-level pol-
icy is to build an L-level info-graph with the structure of a σ-ary tree: for every l ∈ {2, . . . ,L}, each
l-level group observes the sub-history from a disjoint set σ groups in level (l−1). The disjoint sub-
histories observed by all the groups in level l are independent, and under the small gap regime
(similar to Lemma 4.6) it ensures that each arm a has a “lucky” l-level group of agents that only
pull a. This “lucky” property is crucial for ensuring that both arms will be explored in level l.
However, in this construction, the first level will have σL−1 groups, which introduces a mul-
tiplicative factor of σΩ(L) in the regret rate. The exponential dependence in L will heavily limit
the adaptivity of the policy, and prevents having the number of levels for obtaining the result in
Theorem 5.2. To overcome this, we will design an info-graph structure such that the number of
groups at each level stays as σ2 =Θ(log2(T )).
We will leverage the following key observation: in order to maintain the “lucky” property,
it suffices to have Θ(logT ) l-th level groups that observe disjoint sub-histories that take place in
level (l−1). Moreover, as long as the group size in levels lower than (l−1) are substantially smaller
than group size of level l −1, the “lucky” property does not break even if different groups in level
l observe overlapping sub-history from levels {1, . . . , l − 2}.
This motivates the following interlacing connection structure between levels. For each level
in the info-graph, there are σ2 groups for some σ = Θ(log(T )). The groups in the l-th level are
labeled as Gl,u,v for u,v ∈ [σ]. For any l ∈ {2, . . . ,L} and u,v,w ∈ [σ], agents in group Gl,u,v see the
history of agents in group Gl−1,v,w (and by transitivity all agents in levels below l − 1). See Figure
3 for a visualization of simple case with σ = 2). Two observations are in order:
(i) Consider level (l − 1) and fix the last group index to be v, and consider the set of groups
Gl−1,v = {Gl−1,i,v | i ∈ [σ]} (e.g. Gl−1,1,1 and Gl−1,2,1 circled in red in the Figure 3). The agents
in any group of Gl−1,v observe the same sub-history. As a result, if the empirical mean of
arm a is sufficiently high in their shared sub-history, then all groups in Gl−1,v will become
“lucky” for a.
(ii) Every agent in level l observes the sub-history from σ (l − 1)-th level groups, each of which
belonging to a different set Gl−1,v . Thus, for each arm a, we just need one set of groups Gl−1,v
in level l − 1 to be “lucky” for a and then all agents in level l will see sufficient arm a pulls.
Amplifying groups for boundary cases. Recall in the three-level policy, the medium gap case
(Lemma 4.5) corresponds to the case where the gap ∆ is between Ω
(√
1/T1
)
and O
(√
log(T )/T1
)
.
This is a boundary case since ∆ is neither large enough to conclude that with high probability
agents in both the second level and the third level all pull the best arm, nor small enough to
conclude that both arms are explored enough times in the second level (due to anti-concentration).
In this case, we need to ensure that agents in the third level can eliminate the inferior arm. This
issue is easily resolved in the three-level policy since the agents in the third level observe the
entire first-level history, which consists ofΩ(T1 log(T )) pulls of each arm and provides sufficiently
accurate reward estimates to distinguish the two arms.
In the L-level policy, such boundary cases occur for each intermediate level l ∈ {2, . . . , l −1}, but
the issue mentioned above does not get naturally resolved since the ratios between the upper and
lower bounds of ∆ increase fromΘ
(√
log(T )
)
toΘ(log(T )), and it would require more observations
from level (l − 2) to distinguish two arms at level l. The reason for this larger disparity is that,
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Figure 3: Interlacing connections between levels for the L-level policy.
except the first level, our guarantee on the number of pulls of each arm is no longer tight. For
example, as shown in Figure 3, when we talk about having enough arm a pulls in the history
observed by agents in Gl,1,1, it could be that only agents in group Gl−1,1,1 are pulling arm a and it
also could be that most agents in groups Gl−1,1,1,Gl−1,1,2, ...,Gl−1,1,σ are pulling arm a. Therefore
our estimate of the number of arm a pulls can be off by an σ = Θ(log(T )) multiplicative factor.
This ultimately makes the boundary cases harder to deal with.
We resolve this problem by introducing an additional type of amplifying groups, called Γ-
groups. For each l ∈ [L],u,v ∈ [σ], we create a Γ-group Γl,u,v . Agents in Γl,u,v observe the same
history as the one observed by agents in Gl,u,v and the number of agents in Γl,u,v is Θ(log(T )) times
the number of agents in Gl,u,v . The main difference between G-groups and Γ-groups is that the
history of Γ-groups in level l is not sent to agents in level l + 1 but agents in higher levels. When
we are in the boundary case in which we don’t have good guarantees about the l + 1 level agents’
pulls, the new construction makes sure that agents in levels higher than l + 1 get to see enough
pulls of each arm and all pull the best arm.
5.1 Detailed analysis
In this section, we design our L-level recommendation policy for L > 3. Similarly as Section 4, we
first prove them in the case of 2 arms (Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.6). We then extend them to
the case of constant number of arms (Theorem 5.7).
Now we start with the case of 2 arms. Our recommendation policy has L levels and two types
of groups: G-groups and Γ-groups. Each level has σ2 G-groups for σ = 210 log(T ). Label the G-
groups in the l-th level as Gl,u,v for u,v ∈ [σ]. Level 2 to level L also have σ2 Γ-groups. Label the
Γ-groups in the l-th level as Γl,u,v for u,v ∈ [σ]. Each first-level group (G1,u,v for u,v ∈ [σ]) has T1
full-disclosure path of LFDPK rounds in parallel. For l ≥ 2, there are Tl agents in group Gl,u,v and
there are Tl(σ − 1) agents in group Γl,u,v . We will pick T1, ...,TL in the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Finally we define the info-graph. Agents in the first level only observe the history defined in
the full-disclosure path run. For agents in group Gl,u,v with l ≥ 2, they observe all the history in
the first l − 2 levels (both G-groups and Γ-groups) and history in group Gl−1,v,w for all w ∈ [σ].
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Agents in group Γl,u,v observe the same history as agents in group Gl,u,v .
Theorem5.3. The L-level recommendation policy gets regretO
(
T 2
L−1/(2L−1) log2(T )
)
for L ≤ log(ln(T )/ log(σ4)).
In particular, if we pick L = log(ln(T )/ log(σ4)), the regret is O(T 1/2polylog(T )).
Proof. Wlog we assume µ1 ≥ µ2 as the recommendation policy is symmetric to both arms. We will
set Tl ’s later in the proof. Before that, we are only going to assume Tl /Tl−1 ≥ σ4 for l = 2, ...,L − 1
and T1 ≥ σ4.
Similarly as the proof of Theorem 4.2, we start with some clean events.
• Concentration of the number of arm a pulls in the first level:
For a ∈ {1,2}, define NFDPK,a to be the expected number of arm a pulls in one run of full-
disclosure path used in the first level. By Lemma 3.2, we know pFDPK ≤NFDPK,a ≤ LFDPK For group
G1,u,v , defineW
a,u,v
1 to be the event that the number of arm a pulls in this group is between
NFDPK,a T1 − LFDPK
√
T1 log(T ) and N
FDP
K,a T1 +L
FDP
K
√
T1 log(T ). By Chernoff bound,
Pr[W a,u,v1 ] ≥ 1− 2exp(−2log(T )) ≥ 1− 2/T 2.
DefineW1 to be the intersection of all these events (i.e. W1 =
⋂
a,u,vW
a,u,v
1 ). By union bound,
we have
Pr[W1] ≥ 1−
4σ2
T 2
.
• Concentration of the empirical mean of arm a pulls in the history observed by agent t:
For each agent t and arm a, imagine there is a tape of enough arm a pulls sampled before the
recommendation policy starts and these samples are revealed one by one whenever agents
in agent t’s observed history pull arm a. Define W
t,a,τ1,τ2
2 to be the event that the mean of
τ1-th to τ2-th pulls in the tape is at most
√
3log(T )
τ2−τ1+1 away from µa. By Chernoff bound,
Pr[W
t,a,τ1,τ2
2 ] ≥ 1− 2exp(−6log(T )) ≥ 1− 2/T 6.
Define W2 to be the intersection of all these events (i.e. W2 =
⋂
t,a,τ1,τ2
W
t,a,τ1,τ2
2 ). By union
bound, we have
Pr[W2] ≥ 1−
4
T 3
.
• Anti-concentration of the empirical mean of arm a pulls in the l-th level for l ≥ 2:
For 2 ≤ l ≤ L − 1, u ∈ [σ] and each arm a, define nl,u,a to be the number of arm a pulls in
groups Gl,u,1, ...,Gl,u,σ . Define W
l,u,a,high
3 as the event that n
l,u,a ≥ Tl implies the empirical
mean of arm a pulls in group Gl,u,1, ...,Gl,u,σ is at least µa + 1/
√
nl,u,a. DefineW l,u,a,low3 as the
event that nl,u,a ≥ Tl implies the empirical mean of arm a pulls in group Gl,u,1, ...,Gl,u,σ is at
most µa − 1/
√
nl,u,a.
Define Hl to be random variable the history of all agents in the first l − 1 levels and which
agents are chosen in the l-th level. Let hl be some realization of Hl . Notice that once we fix
Hl , n
l,u,a is also fixed.
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Now consider hl to be any possible realized value of Hl . If fixing Hl = hl makes n
l,u,a < Tl ,
then Pr[W
l,u,a,high
3 |Hl = hl ] = 1 If fixing Hl = hl makes nl,u,a ≥ Tl , by Berry-Esseen Theorem
and µa ∈ [1/3,2/3], we have
Pr[W
l,u,a,high
3 |Hl = hl ] ≥ (1−Φ(1/2))−
5√
Tl
> 1/4.
Similarly we also have
Pr[W l,u,a,low3 |Hl = hl ] > 1/4
SinceW
l,u,a,high
3 is independent withW
l,u,3−a,low
3 when fixing Hl , we have
Pr[W
l,u,a,high
3 ∩W l,u,3−a,low3 |Hl = hl ] > (1/4)2 = 1/16.
Now defineW l,a3 =
⋃
u(W
l,u,a,high
3 ∩W l,u,3−a,low3 ). Since (W
l,u,a,high
3 ∩W l,u,3−a,low3 ) are indepen-
dent across different u’s when fixing Hl = hl , we have
Pr[W l,a3 |Hl = hl ] ≥ 1− (1− 1/16)σ ≥ 1− 1/T 2.
Since this holds for all hl ’s, we have Pr[W
l,a
3 ] ≥ 1 − 1/T 2. Finally define W3 =
⋂
l,aW
l,a
3 . By
union bound, we have
W3 ≥ 1− 2L/T 2.
• Anti-concentration of the empirical mean of arm a pulls in the first level:
For first-level groups G1,u,1, ...,G1,u,σ and arm a, imagine there is a tape of enough arm a
pulls sampled before the recommendation policy starts and these samples are revealed one
by one whenever agents in these groups pull arm a. DefineW
u,a,high
4 to be the event that first
NFDPK,a T1σ pulls of arm a in the tape has empirical mean at least µa + 1/
√
NFDPK,a T1σ and define
W u,a,low4 to be the event that first N
FDP
K,a T1σ pulls of arm a in the tape has empirical mean at
most µa − 1/
√
NFDPK,a T1σ . By Berry-Esseen Theorem and µa ∈ [1/3,2/3], we have
Pr[W
u,a,high
4 ] ≥ (1−Φ(1/2))−
5√
NFDPK,a T1σ
> 1/4.
The last inequality follows when T is larger than some constant. Similarly we also have
Pr[W u,a,low4 ] > 1/4.
SinceW
u,a,high
4 is independent withW
u,3−a,low
4 , we have
Pr[W
u,a,high
4 ∩W u,3−a,low4 ] = Pr[W
u,a,high
4 ] ·Pr[W u,3−a,low4 ] > (1/4)2 = 1/16.
Now define W a4 as
⋃
u(W
u,a,high
4 ∩W u,3−a,low4 ). Notice that (W
u,a,high
4 ∩W u,3−a,low4 ) are inde-
pendent across different u’s. So we have
Pr[W a4 ] ≥ 1− (1− 1/16)σ ≥ 1− 1/T 2.
Finally we defineW4 as
⋂
aW
a
4 . By union bound,
Pr[W4] ≥ 1− 2/T 2.
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By union bound, the intersection of these clean events (i.e.
⋂4
i=1Wi) happens with probability
1−O(1/T ). When this intersection does not happen, since the probability is O(1/T ), it contributes
O(1/T ) ·T =O(1) to the regret.
Nowwe assume the intersection of clean events happens and prove upper bound on the regret.
By eventW1, we know that in each first-level group, there are at least N
FDP
K,a T1 −LFDPK
√
T1 log(T )
pulls of arm a. We prove in the next claim that there are enough pulls of both arms in higher levels
if µ1−µ2 is small enough. For notation convenience, we set ε0 = 1, ε1 = 1
4
√
NFDPK,a T1σ
+ 1
4
√
NFDPK,3−aT1σ
and
εl = 1/(4
√
Tlσ) for l ≥ 2.
Claim 5.4. For any arm a and 2 ≤ l ≤ L, if µ1−µ2 ≤ εl−1, then for any u ∈ [σ], there are at least Tl pulls
of arm a in groups Gl,u,1,Gl,u,2, ...,Gl,u,σ and there are at least Tlσ(σ − 1) pulls of arm a in the l-th level
Γ-groups.
Proof. We are going to show that for each l and arm a there exists ua such that agents in groups
Gl,1,ua , ...,Gl,σ,ua and Γl,1,ua , ...,Γl,σ,ua all pull arm a. This suffices to prove the claim.
We prove the above via induction on l. We start by the base case when l = 2. For each arm a,
W4 implies there exists ua such that W
ua ,a,high
4 and W
ua ,3−a,low
4 happen. For an agent t in groups
G2,1,ua , ...,G2,σ,ua and Γ2,1,ua , ...,Γ2,σ,ua . W
ua ,a,high
4 ,W
a,ua ,v
1 andW2 together imply that
µ¯ta ≥ µa +
NFDPK,a T1σ · 1√NFDPK,a T1σ − L
FDP
K
√
T1 log(T )σ ·
√
3log(T )
LFDPK
√
T1 log(T )σ
 · 1(NFDPK,a T1 +LFDPK √T1 log(T ))σ
> µa +
1
4
√
NFDPK,a T1σ
.
The second last inequality holds when T is larger than some constant. Similarly, we also have
µ¯t3−a < µ3−a −
1
4
√
NFDPK,3−aT1σ
.
Then we have
µ¯ta − µ¯t3−a > µa −µ3−a +
1
4
√
NFDPK,a T1σ
+
1
4
√
NFDPK,3−aT1σ
≥ −ε1 +
1
4
√
NFDPK,a T1σ
+
1
4
√
NFDPK,3−aT1σ
≥ 1
8
√
NFDPK,a T1σ
+
1
8
√
NFDPK,3−aT1σ
.
25
By Assumption 2.1, we have
µˆta − µˆt3−a > µ¯ta − µ¯t3−a −
Cest√
NFDPK,a T1σ/2
− Cest√
NFDPK,3−aT1σ/2
>
1
8
√
NFDPK,a T1σ
+
1
8
√
NFDPK,3−aT1σ
− Cest√
NFDPK,a T1σ/2
− Cest√
NFDPK,3−aT1σ/2
> 0.
The last inequality holds since Cest is a small enough constant defined in Assumption 2.1. There-
fore we know agents in groups G2,1,ua , ...,G2,σ,ua and Γ2,1,ua , ...,Γ2,σ,ua all pull arm a.
Now we consider the case when l > 2 and assume the claim is true for smaller l’s. For each
arm a, W3 implies that there exists ua such that W
l−1,ua ,a,high
3 and W
l−1,ua ,3−a,low
3 happen. Recall
nl−1,ua,a is the number of arm a pulls in groups Gl−1,ua ,1, ...,Gl−1,ua ,σ . The induction hypothesis
implies that nl−1,ua ,a ≥ Tl−1. W l−1,ua ,a,high3 together with nl−1,ua,a ≥ Tl−1 implies that the empirical
mean of arm a pulls in group Gl−1,ua ,1, ...,Gl−1,ua ,σ is at least µa + 1/
√
nl−1,ua ,a. For any agent t in
groups Gl,1,ua , ...,Gl,σ,ua and Γl,1,ua , ...,Γl,σ,ua , it observes history of groups Gl−1,ua,1, ...,Gl−1,ua ,σ and
all groups in levels below level l − 1. Notice that the groups in the first l − 2 levels have at most
(T1L
FDP
K +T2 + · · ·+Tl−2)σ3 ≤ Tl−1/(12log(T )) ≤ nl−1,ua,a/(12log(T )) agents. ByW2, we have
µ¯ta ≥ µa +
nl−1,ua ,a · 1√
nl−1,ua,a
− (T1LFDPK +T2 + · · ·+Tl−2)σ3 ·
√
3log(T )
(T1L
FDP
K +T2 + · · ·+Tl−2)σ3

· 1
nl−1,ua,a + (T1LFDPK +T2 + · · ·+Tl−2)σ3
> µa +
1
4
√
nl−1,ua,a
.
The third last inequality holds when T larger than some constant. Similarly, we also have
µ¯t3−a < µ3−a −
1
4
√
nl−1,ua,3−a
.
Then we have
µ¯ta − µ¯t3−a > µa −µ3−a +
1
4
√
nl−1,ua ,a
+
1
4
√
nl−1,ua ,3−a
≥ −εl−1 +
1
4
√
nl−1,ua,a
+
1
4
√
nl−1,ua,3−a
≥ 1
8
√
nl−1,ua,a
+
1
8
√
nl−1,ua ,3−a
.
The last inequality holds because nl−1,ua,a and nl−1,ua ,3−a are at most Tl−1σ . By Assumption 2.1, we
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have
µˆta − µˆt3−a > µ¯ta − µ¯t3−a −
Cest√
nl−1,ua,a
− Cest√
nl−1,ua ,3−a
>
1
8
√
nl−1,ua,a
+
1
8
√
nl−1,ua,3−a
− Cest√
nl−1,ua ,a
− Cest√
nl−1,ua,3−a
> 0.
The last inequality holds since Cest is a small enough constant defined in Assumption 2.1. There-
fore agents in groups Gl,1,ua , ...,Gl,σ,ua and Γl,1,ua , ...,Γl,σ,ua all pull arm a.
Claim 5.5. For any 2 ≤ l ≤ L, if εl−1σ ≤ µ1−µ2 < εl−2σ , there are no pulls of arm 2 in groups with level
l, ...,L.
Proof. We argue in 2 cases εl−1
√
σ ≤ µ1 − µ2 ≤ εl−2 for l ≥ 2 and εl−2 ≤ µ1 − µ2 ≤ εl−2
√
σ for l > 2.
Since our recommendation policy’s first level is slightly different from other levels, we need to
argue case εl−1
√
σ ≤ µ1 −µ2 ≤ εl−2 for l = 2 and case εl−2 ≤ µ1 −µ2 ≤ εl−2
√
σ for l = 3 separately.
• εl−1σ ≤ µ1 −µ2 ≤ εl−2 for l = 2(i.e. ε1σ ≤ µ1 −µ2 ≤ ε0): We know agents in level at least 2 will
observe at least NFDPK,a T1/2 pulls of arm a for a ∈ {1,2}. ByW2, for any agent in level at least 2,
we have
|µ¯ta −µa| ≤
√
3log(T )
σNFDPK,a T1/2
.
By Assumption 2.1, we have
µˆt1 − µˆt2 ≥ µ¯t1 − µ¯t2 −
Cest√
σNFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
σNFDPK,2 T1/2
≥ µ1 −µ2 −
√
3log(T )
σNFDPK,1 T1/2
−
√
3log(T )
σNFDPK,2 T1/2
− Cest√
σNFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
σNFDPK,2 T1/2
≥
√
σ
4
√
NFDPK,1 T1
+
√
σ
4
√
NFDPK,2 T1
−
√
3log(T )
σNFDPK,1 T1/2
−
√
3log(T )
σNFDPK,2 T1/2
− Cest√
σNFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
σNFDPK,2 T1/2
> 0.
Therefore agents in level at least 2 will all pull arm 1.
• εl−1σ ≤ µ1 −µ2 ≤ εl−2 for l > 2: By claim 5.4, for any agent t in level at least l, that agent will
observe at least Tl−1 arm a pulls. ByW2, we have
|µ¯ta −µa| ≤
√
3log(T )
Tl−1
.
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By Assumption 2.1, we have
µˆt1 − µˆt2 ≥ µ¯t1 − µ¯t2 −
2Cest√
Tl−1
≥ µ1 −µ2 − 2
√
3log(T )
Tl−1
− 2Cest√
Tl−1
≥
√
σ
16Tl−1
− 2
√
3log(T )
Tl−1
− 2Cest√
Tl−1
> 0.
Therefore agents in level at least l will all pull arm 1.
• εl−2 < µ1 −µ2 < εl−2σ for l = 3 (i.e. ε1 < µ1 − µ2 < ε1σ): By Claim 5.4, for any agent t in level
at least 3, that agent will observe at least T1N
FDP
K,a σ
2/2 arm a pulls (just from the first level).
ByW2, we have
|µ¯ta −µa| ≤
√
3log(T )
σ2NFDPK,a T1/2
.
By Assumption 2.1, we have
µˆt1 − µˆt2 ≥ µ¯t1 − µ¯t2 −
Cest√
σ2NFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
σ2NFDPK,2 T1/2
≥ µ1 −µ2 −
√
3log(T )
σ2NFDPK,1 T1/2
−
√
3log(T )
σ2NFDPK,2 T1/2
− Cest√
σ2NFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
σ2NFDPK,2 T1/2
≥ 1
4
√
σNFDPK,1 T1
+
1
4
√
σNFDPK,2 T1
−
√
3log(T )
σ2NFDPK,1 T1/2
−
√
3log(T )
σ2NFDPK,2 T1/2
− Cest√
σ2NFDPK,1 T1/2
− Cest√
σ2NFDPK,2 T1/2
> 0.
Therefore agents in level at least 3 will all pull arm 1.
• εl−2 < µ1 − µ2 < εl−2σ for l > 3: Since µ1 − µ2 < εl−2σ < εl−3, by Claim 5.4, for any agent t in
level at least l, that agent will observe at least Tl−2σ2 arm a pulls (just from level l − 2). By
W2, we have
|µ¯ta −µa| ≤
√
3log(T )
σ2Tl−2
.
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By Assumption 2.1, we have
µˆt1 − µˆt2 ≥ µ¯t1 − µ¯t2 −
2Cest√
σ2Tl−2
≥ µ1 −µ2 − 2
√
3log(T )
σ2Tl−2
− 2Cest√
σ2Tl−2
≥ 1
4
√
σTl−2
− 2
√
3log(T )
Tl−1
− 2Cest√
Tl−1
> 0.
Therefore agents in level at least l will all pull arm 1.
Now we set the group sizes Tl ’s as following. For l < L,
Tl = T
2L−1+2L−2+···+2L−l
2L−1+2L−2+···+1 /σ3.
and
TL = (T −T1 · LFDPK ·σ2 − (T2 + · · ·+Tl−1)σ3)/σ3
We restrict L to be at most log(ln(T )/ log(σ4)) so that Tl /Tl−1 ≥ T 1/2L ≥ σ4 for l = 2, ...,L − 1. TL is a
little bit different because we want total number of agents to be T .
By Claim 5.5, we know that the regret conditioned the intersection of clean events is at most
max
(
T1L
FDP
K σ
2,max
l≥2
εl−1σ(T1LFDPK σ
2 +T2σ
3 + · · ·+Tlσ3)
)
≤max
(
T1L
FDP
K σ
2,max
l≥2
2εl−1Tlσ4
)
=O
(
T 2
L−1/(2L−1) log2(T )
)
.
Now we are going to change the parameters of the L-level recommendation policy a little
bit and prove the below corollary. We will keep σ the same (i.e. σ = 210 log(T )). We are going
to change L and T1, ...,TL. We set L = log(T )/ log(σ
4), Tl = (σ
4)l for l = 1, ...,L − 1 and TL = (T −
T1L
FDP
K σ
2 −σ3∑L−1l=2 Tl )/σ3.
Corollary 5.6. With the proper setting of L and T1, ...,TL described above, the L-level recommendation
policy gets regretO(min(1/∆,T 1/2)polylog(T )). Here ∆ = |µ1−µ2| and the L-level recommendation pol-
icy does not need to know ∆. Moreover, agent t observes a subhistory of size at least Ω(⌊t/polylog(T )⌋).
Proof. Notice that in the proof of Theorem 5.3, by the end of Claim 5.5, the only constraint we
need about Tl ’s is that Tl /Tl−1 ≥ σ4 for l = 2, ...,L − 1 and T1 ≥ σ4. And our new settings of Tl ’s still
satisfy this constraint. So we can reuse the proof of Theorem 5.3 till the end of Claim 5.5.
Recall in the proof of Theorem 5.3, εl = Θ(1/
√
Tlσ) for l ∈ [L − 1] and ε0 = 1. Consider two
cases:
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• ∆ < εL−1σ . In this case, notice that even always picking the sub-optimal arm gives ex-
pected regret at most T (µ1 − µ2) = T∆ = O(T 1/2polylog(T )). On the other hand, T 1/2 =
O(polylog(T )/∆). Therefore, the regret is O(min(1/∆,T 1/2)polylog(T )).
• ∆ ≥ εL−1σ . In this case, we can find l ∈ {2, ...,L} such that εl−1σ ≤ ∆ < εl−2σ . By Claim 5.5, we
can upper bound the regret by
∆ · (T1LFDPK σ2 +T2σ3 + · · ·Tl−1σ3)
=O(∆Tl−1σ3)
=O(∆Tl−2σ7)
=O(∆ · 1
ε2l−2
·σ6)
=O(∆ · 1
∆2
·σ8)
=O(polylog(T )/∆).
We also have 1/∆ ≤ 1/(εL−1σ) =O(T 1/2). Therefore, the regret isO(min(1/∆,T 1/2)polylog(T )).
Finally we discuss about the subhistory sizes. We know that agents in level l observes the
history of all agents below level l − 2 (including level l − 2). It is easy to check that the ratio
between the number of agents below level l and the number of agents below level l −2 is bounded
by O(polylog(T )). Therefore our statement about the subhistory sizes holds.
Here we discuss about how to extend Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.6 to the case when K is a
constant larger than 2. As the proof is very similar to the proofs of Theorem 5.3 and Corollary
5.6, we only provide a proof sketch of what changes to make.
Theorem 5.7. Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.6 can be extended to the case when K is constant larger
than 2. In the extension of Corollary 5.6, ∆ is defined as the difference between means of the best and
the second best arm.
Proof Sketch. We still wlog assume arm 1 has the highest mean (i.e. µ1 ≥ µa,∀a ∈ A. We first
extend the clean events (i.e. W1,W2,W3,W4) in Theorem 5.3 to the case when K is larger than
2. W1 and W2 extend naturally: we still set W1 =
⋂
a,sW
a,s
1 and W2 =
⋂
t,a,τ1,τ2
W
t,a,τ1,τ2
2 . The
difference is that now a is taken over K arms instead of 2 arms. ForW3, we change the definition
W l,a3 =
⋃
u
(
W
l,u,a,high
3 ∩
(⋂
a′,aW
l,u,a′ ,low
3
))
and W3 =
⋂
l,aW
l,a
3 . We extend W4 in a similar way:
define W a4 as
⋃
u
(
W
u,a,high
4 ∩
(⋂
a′,aW
u,a′ ,low
4
))
and W4 =
⋂
aW
a
4 . Since K is a constant, it’s easy to
check that the same proof technique shows that the intersection of these clean events happen with
probability 1 −O(1/T ). So the case when some clean event does not happen contributes O(1) to
the regret.
Now we proceed to extend Claim 5.4 and Claim 5.5. The statement of Claim 5.4 should be
changed to “For any arm a and 2 ≤ l ≤ L, if µ1 − µa ≤ εl−1, then for any u ∈ [σ], there are at least
Tl pulls of arm a in groups Gl,u,1,Gl,u,2, ...,Gl,u,σ and there are at least Tlσ(σ − 1) pulls of arm a in
the l-th level Γ-groups”. The statement of Claim 5.5 should be changed to “For any 2 ≤ l ≤ L, if
εl−1σ ≤ µ1 −µa < εl−2σ , there are no pulls of arm a in groups with level l, ...,L.”
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The proof of Claim 5.5 can be easily changed to prove the new version by changing “arm 2” to
“arm a”. The proof of Claim 5.4 needs some additional argument. In the proof of Claim 5.4, we
show that µˆta − µˆ3−a > 0 for agent t in the chosen groups. When extending to more than 2 arms, we
need to show µˆta − µˆta′ > 0 for all arm a′ , a. The proof of Claim 5.4 goes through if µ1 − µa′ ≤ εl−2
since then there will be enough arm a′ pulls in level l − 1. We need some additional argument for
the case when µ1 −µa′ > εl−2. Since µ1 −µa′ > εl−2 > εl−1σ , we can use the same proof of Claim 5.5
(which rely on Claim 5.4 but for smaller l’s) to show that there are no arm a′ pulls in level l and
therefore µˆta − µˆta′ > 0.
Finally we proceed to bound the regret conditioned on the intersection of clean events hap-
pens. The proofs of Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.6 bound it by consider the regret from pulling
the suboptimal arm (i.e. arm 2). When extending to more than 2 arms, we can do the exactly same
argument for all arms except arm 1. This will blow up the regret by a factor of (K − 1) which is a
constant.
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